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Abstract 
 
Epidemics, such as HIV in the early 1980’s and Ebola in 2014, inspire decisive 
government investment and action, and individual and societal concern, 
sometimes bordering on panic. In contrast, endemic diseases, such as HIV in 
2017 and tuberculosis, struggle to maintain the same attention. For many, the 
paradox is that endemic disease, in its totality, continues to impose a far higher 
public health burden than epidemic disease. By and large, the swift political 
response to epidemics has resulted in success. It has proven possible to eradicate 
epidemic diseases, often without the availability of vaccines and other 
biomedical technologies. In recent times, only HIV has made the transition from 
epidemic to endemic, but diseases that have existed for centuries continue to 
cause most of the infectious disease burden.  
 
  
Main text 
 
Characterization of a disease as either epidemic or endemic is commonly 
understood epidemiologically, but we argue that the social framing of a disease 
as ‘epidemic’ or ‘endemic’ is equally important. For livestock, the relationship 
between disease phase and social response is made more explicit: diseases are 
defined as “exotic”, and thence acquire a legal status requiring government 
action to eliminate them. Other endemic or livestock “production diseases” are 
permitted to remain endemic (1). By contrast, in human health, disease status 
and responses are rarely legally determined. As with animal diseases, human 
diseases acquire a social status, primarily based on their perceived risk, that 
determines their acceptability and the level of intervention deemed appropriate. 
In this exploration of the characteristics of epidemic and endemic infectious 
disease, we highlight the pivotal role of risk and risk perception in explaining 
individual and societal responses to diseases in different phases of their 
establishment in populations. The heterogeneity of risk across populations is one 
of the key aspects we consider. We argue that individual and societal risks both 
determine, and are determined by, the classification of a disease as an epidemic 
or endemic. Thus, the classification of disease as ‘epidemic’ or ‘endemic’ reflects 
both biological and social phenomena.  
 
The public response 
 
Responses to ‘epidemics’ tend to be public, seemingly without resource 
constraints, and often combine the efforts of national and global public health 
institutions. For example, HIV provoked over a ten-fold rise in development 
funding for health in a decade, and the forming of new public institutions such as 
UNAIDs (2). As diseases become ‘endemic’, they become increasingly tolerated, 
and the locus of responsibility may shift to the individual. Rather than public 
authorities actively detecting cases and subsiding risk protection, people may be 
increasingly encouraged to pay for the means to manage their own risk and seek 
care. Likewise, the focus of any global response may move away from direct 
provision of services by international agencies, to other forms of intervention, 
such as building national capacity more generally, supported by domestic 
financing (3).  
 
For many, the primacy of the national and global response to epidemics appears 
an “over-reaction”, as resources are pulled in across government departments to 
rapidly control and limit the outbreak. Responses may thus be perceived as 
being at the detriment to other health priorities, such as routine vaccination. 
Epidemics may provoke broad multi-sectoral responses led by the political 
executive, mass information campaigns and military mobilization. Epidemics 
may also mobilize substantial public investment in vaccines or the development 
of treatments: the UK government is estimated to have spent 1.2 billion pounds 
sterling on the swine flu epidemic (4), and licensing arrangements for 
diagnostics, medicines and vaccines in emergencies are relaxed (5). The 
rationale for the political imperative is two-fold. First, epidemics can most (cost)-
effectively be controlled when the number of cases is very small, and thus even 
an ill-informed rapid response may be more beneficial and efficient than a 
cautious informed one (6). Second, there is a (often highly uncertain) risk of 
catastrophic impact: epidemics have destroyed civilizations. Politicians therefore 
need to weigh investment against highly uncertain, but potentially devastating 
social, health and economic consequences. The “public health paradox” ensures 
that if the epidemic is successfully controlled, then it is highly likely that the 
eventual impact of the epidemic disease will have been less than the opportunity 
cost of the resources allocated to it from other health areas. The experience of 
1918 still serves to remind us, that had we not responded to H1N1 as we did, it 
could have been much, much worse.  
 
At some point, the socio-political response to an emerging disease starts to 
change. Investment in the disease may become institutionalized in the health 
sector – with those who recognize the importance of broader social drivers and 
impact of infectious disease struggling to mobilize other sectors. For example, 
despite the long acknowledged association between poverty and tuberculosis 
(TB) (7) combined health and social intervention remains a rarity, and are only 
now being pioneered in countries such as South Africa where TB has embedded 
itself as the largest killer. Financing may stabilize or diminish, in part as other 
disease areas or the health system recuperates from any temporary loss of 
funding caused by the epidemic (2). Resourcing the response becomes 
increasingly based on known risks and benefits that can be more clearly 
compared with alternative investments in the health sector or beyond, 
articulated in ‘investment cases’ for specific diseases (8). Health insurance 
organizations, which at this stage are able to predict risk, may start to cover any 
response in their insurance benefits (and premiums). The disease itself takes on 
an “identity”, and interest groups form out of the populations where the disease 
is becoming ‘endemic’ often advocating for attention and action. The disease now 
must compete for attention and resources with other endemic diseases, even if 
the benefits of disease control still clearly outweigh the costs (8).  
 
The private response 
 
The public responses to epidemic and endemic diseases mirror those of 
individuals. At a personal level, epidemics may inspire panic largely because the 
risk of acquisition of infection is impossible to gauge, and treatments are limited. 
As individuals act to avoid (often highly unknown) risks, they are willing to 
behave in ways that may have substantial social and economic costs and 
consequences. People may avoid work, take children out of school, and flee or 
minimize travel (9). This reaction and its consequential costs are often not borne 
evenly across populations. The ability of an individual to act is constrained by 
economic and social circumstances, and thus even at an early stage, epidemics 
start to impact different groups in society differentially, as has been documented 
for the Ebola virus epidemic in Liberia (10). Stigmatization of those perceived to 
be at greatest risk of infection and transmission is common. 
 
As epidemics transition into endemic disease, people develop a perception that 
they understand the risks of infection, giving them a sense of control. Generally, 
people cope with risk by adjusting behavior and mitigating the consequences, 
often to the point at which any new behaviors become a tolerated part of life. 
The move of the locus of responsibility from government to individual can then 
be enabled by a belief that individuals can now make informed choices, even 
where those individuals are highly constrained by their circumstances. For 
example, new forms of funding the means of risk protection may emerge, such as 
the social marketing of condoms or malaria bed-nets, ultimately sharing the 
financial burden of the disease even among the very poor. As a disease becomes 
endemic, governments generally still provide some funding for treatment, but in 
the context of resource scarcity, governments may fail to fund universal access, 
leaving many to access private care, even where treatment may prevent others 
from being infected, such as the case of TB or HIV. For many interest groups this 
is an “under-reaction”, compared with the epidemic response. Even when the 
disease has settled into populations, these groups may continue to sustain the 
political imperative associated with epidemics (11); calling for urgent action to 
end the disease, unfortunately often with limited success.  
 
The determinants of risk 
 
The risk and perception of risk that drives the societal response to disease is a 
combination of the probability of infection coupled with the consequences of 
infection – the widespread fear associated with epidemics, is often driven by the 
lack of effective treatment. In 2017, most of us would prefer a diagnosis of HIV to 
one of Ebola virus, but the distinction would have been less clear prior to 1995 
when less effective drugs were available. Epidemic diseases typically have higher 
mortality and morbidity than endemic diseases, owing to lack of clinical 
experience and knowledge, as well as innate pathogenicity. Over time, effective 
prevention and treatment interventions emerge. However, although improved 
treatment is clearly a good thing, and reduces the risk of catastrophic loss of 
individual health, the reduction in risk may also provoke a decline in political 
interest, initiating a more endemic style response. Where anti-microbial 
resistance emerges, reducing the treatability of endemic diseases such as TB, 
fear may return and one again inspire a more ‘epidemic’ style response.  
 
Paradoxically, the amount of public funding needed to respond to infectious 
diseases may increase during a transition from epidemic to endemic, as those 
organizations which made the initial investments in medical technologies to 
prevent, diagnose and treat the disease attempt to recoup their investment. The 
resource estimates for HIV were moderate initially, but as effective treatment 
emerged, increased substantially (8). Likewise, the availability of more effective 
treatment may increase costs to households, as the disease becomes chronic 
rather than acute, leaving households having to deal with the costs of long-term 
illness, and of accessing care. For some population groups, unable to afford the 
costs of accessing treatment (7), this can worsen the endemic and entrenched 
nature of the disease, by reinforcing cycles between risk and poverty; potentially 
exacerbating initial differentiation of risks that emerged in the epidemic stage.  
 
If diseases become entrenched in certain population groups, and without 
substantial investment and political will, endemic diseases then may become 
very expensive and difficult to control, eliminate and eradicate.  Immunization is 
generally seen as essential for eradication campaigns, although Guinea worm is 
likely to be the first infection eradicated without recourse to immunization. 
Global-scale elimination and eradication of tuberculosis, malaria and (now) HIV 
appear to be a long way off, but the biomedical tools we have for these diseases 
are effective, plentiful, and relatively low cost, and offer huge potential to reduce 
the disease burden substantially. These tools are substantially better than those 
available for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory 
syndrome (MERS) and Ebola, all of which have been successfully eliminated. The 
difference is in the political willingness to provide the necessary funding at the 
scale required, reflecting an intrinsic societal acceptance that populations should 
tolerate risk of infection in a way that they do for other health interventions. 
 
Yet, individuals are not at equivalent risk of acquiring or transmitting infection in 
epidemic or endemic phases (12). As epidemics proceed, infection becomes 
increasingly associated with socially defined groups, which are at higher risk of 
infection and usually a small proportion of the population. However, the 
behaviors that make the risk of infection for some groups higher are not 
exclusive to those groups, and as the disease becomes endemic, the importance 
of the high-risk groups that dominated in epidemics is reduced. For example, at 
the start of the HIV epidemic, individuals with the highest rates of sexual partner 
change are more likely to be infected, and transmit at a higher rate: they are core 
to the epidemic’s progression. As HIV becomes more endemic, individuals with 
the same behavior remains at high individual risk of infection with HIV, but the 
majority of transmission might come from individuals with lower rates of sexual 
partner change. This is for two reasons. First, the number of infected individuals 
with lower rates of sexual partner change is much greater than those with high 
rates of sexual partner change.  Second, the status of the partners is different – 
people at high risk are at high risk because a high proportion of their partners 
are already infected, whereas people with lower rates of change are more likely 
to have partners who can be infected. Consequently, as infection disseminates 
through populations, the risk of acquisition and the rate of transmission become 
less well correlated. 
 
Therefore, as epidemic disease transitions into endemic disease, even though it 
becomes entrenched in specific groups, it also may increasingly move towards 
Rose’s “prevention paradox”: that is small, common risks are responsible for 
more disease than large, rare risks (13). Additionally, individuals might get 
infected in one group and transmit to another. For example, older male partners 
might transmit HIV to adolescent girls and young women, who then infect their 
male peers (14). It is no longer the case that funding can be targeted intensively 
at small high-risk groups. Groups with the highest risk of infection become 
increasingly decoupled from those with the highest risk of dissemination. This 
complicates question of allocation of scarce resources for endemic diseases: 
should they be allocated to those most likely to transmit or those most likely to 
be infected? 
 
In the early phases of epidemics, populations at risk are usually considered 
constant and births and deaths and life-course of behavior, which may result in 
transitions between risk groups, are ignored. For example, commercial sex 
workers are at high risk of HIV infection, but there is relatively little 
consideration given to their risks prior to entering this category, or after they 
leave. In the transition to endemicity, social and economic transitions continue to 
be critical to understanding how infection is disseminated in a population, and 
the dynamics of the individual risks of infection and transmission. Actions taken 
by individuals to address their poverty could lead to the spread of the disease, 
for example, the movement of female sex workers around festivals in India, or 
miners in South Africa with tuberculosis returning home. Migrating populations, 
such as refugees, may also have poor access to risk protection, as they often are 
the groups least covered by health and social insurance.  
 
The evolving risk of infection during endemicity can therefore be most easily 
understood and predicted in terms of structural drivers of risk, i.e. the economic, 
political, social factors that determine the size of these groups, and individuals’ 
exposure to infection and ability to access prevention and treatment services 
(15).  Over time, inequalities in risk can become entrenched, reflecting social 
structures and constraints, and, as with other form of inequities become, 
essentially, tolerated. In the UK, it is accepted that TB is associated with 
homelessness and recent immigration, and HIV is associated with men who have 
sex with men. Disease often continues to be endemic in specific population 
groups despite the availability of interventions to reduce transmission (i.e. 
condoms, microbicides), and effective treatments, reflecting the social and 
economic constraints to access and use of means of prevention and treatment 
services. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued that in the wider public arena epidemics and endemics are 
distinguished by the individual and social perceptions and tolerance of risk. At a 
public level, we have the endemic diseases we have because widespread multi-
sectoral action, eradication or elimination are not sufficiently politically 
appealing, despite the fact that investment is often cost-effective. The contained 
public response, and the concurrent shift of responsibility to individuals to 
protect themselves from risk, means that endemic disease embeds itself further, 
as those at risk are often the very same people who do not have the private 
resources to avoid risk or access treatment. The endemic diseases we have are 
those that have found a “niche” in social geography, and often they reinforce that 
niche. The labels ‘endemic’, ‘intractable’ and ‘non-eradicable’ are self-fulfilling 
descriptions of settled endemicity.   
 
Actions to address the social and structural determinants of infectious disease 
are increasingly being embedded in the response to both epidemic and endemic 
disease. The better the infrastructure and systems of preparedness and rapid 
responses to epidemics, the better we avert the unnecessary expenditures and 
costs associated with rapid action in the face of uncertain, high-risk 
consequences. Encouragingly, the use of approaches rooted in anthropology and 
the social sciences are now beginning to be integrated in the infrastructure of 
early epidemic responses, and may improve efficiency of the response and 
prevent the emergence of endemicity in specific population groups (16). For 
diseases that are ‘endemic’, there is increasing policy recognition that a 
combined social and biomedical response is central to any strategy for 
elimination (17,18). Examples of the success of combined social and biomedical 
intervention, such as the scale-up of community based HIV prevention in India, 
are encouraging (19). However, there is still much to be done before social 
intervention is a commonplace component of infectious disease responses. 
Acknowledging that epidemics and endemics are intrinsically socially as well as 
epidemiologically defined is a critical step forward in developing the 
comprehensive response that is required to address the complex challenge of 
infectious disease elimination.     
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